

Mechanism Design for Participatory Budgeting


Simon Rey

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Algorithmic Decision Theory 2021 — PhD Day

Participatory Budgeting


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💰 : 7000€

Participatory Budgeting

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💰 : 7000€

Participatory Budgeting



1000€



2000€



2500€



2500€



5000€



: 7000€

A Social Choice Problem

Multi-Winner Voting



Candidate 1



Candidate 2



Candidate 3



Candidate 4



Candidate 5



Candidate 6



Participatory Budgeting



1000€



2000€



2500€



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
5000€




: 7000€


A Social Choice Problem

Multi-Winner Voting



Participatory Budgeting



 : 7000€

A money bag icon with a dollar sign inside, followed by the text ": 7000€".

↳ Participatory budgeting can be seen as an extension of multi-winner voting in which a budget constraint is added.

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↳ All these properties cannot be achieved simultaneously, but we can study them independently and try to identify the overlap!

A Selection of Works

Participatory Budgeting Grounded in Judgment Aggregation (KR 2020), explains how to efficiently use the expressive power of judgment aggregation for participatory budgeting.

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- Can we characterise some participatory budgeting rules by means of axioms?